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The Modification of the Chinese
Exchange Rate Policy
Its rationale, extent and recent developments
Michael Goujon et Samuel Guérineau
1 On 21st July 2005, the Chinese Central Bank revalued the yuan from 8.27 to 8.11 per US
dollar. This small revaluation (2.1%) was accompanied by an official modification of the
exchange rate system. The authorities  announced that  “the yuan will  be no longer
pegged to the US dollar” and that “China will  reform the exchange rate regime by
moving into a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and
demand with reference to a basket of currencies”2. They did not publish details of the
composition of this basket.
2 The revaluation occurred during an intense two-year long debate, among scholars and
political  leaders  about  Chinese  exchange  rate  policy,  since  2003.  American  policy-
makers have often complained that the yuan has long been significantly undervalued,
giving  China  an  unfair  trade  advantage.  Thus,  China  is  blamed  for  a  “currency
manipulation” that induces job losses in the United States, Japan, Europe and other
Asian countries,  threatening world economic equilibrium. The yuan being revalued,
one  might  think,  is  due  to  China  yielding  to  this  international  pressure  (and
recognising its responsibility in the imbalance in world trade). 
3 This paper suggests that this interpretation is simplistic and misleading. First of all, it
has been demonstrated that for 25 years the Chinese exchange rate policy has aimed at
both  internal  and  external  targets—and  not  only  export  competitiveness3.
Consequently,  both  must  be  taken  into  account  in  interpreting  any  exchange  rate
policy modification. Following this, this paper looks at the rationale behind the recent
modification of the Chinese exchange rate policy in reviewing the two debates on the
need for revaluation and greater flexibility.  The last  section explores the short-run
impact of this decision.
The debate on the revaluationIs the yuan undervalued?
4 To  provide  empirical  elements  to  the  debate  on  the  undervaluation  of  the  yuan,
numerous studies have recently been dedicated to the assessment of misalignment of
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the yuan. This series of studies since 2003 was preceded by another series in the late
1990s, which attempted to assess the sustainability of the peg to the dollar after the
Asian financial crisis (an overvaluation was then suspected). As expected for a rapidly
transforming economy, the estimated size of misalignment differs significantly across
studies, and some estimations show almost perfectly reversed evolutions4.
5 From  Figure  1  where  these  estimations  are  reported,  several  general  results  may
however be emphasised: i) The initial overvaluation progressively disappeared during
the  1980s;  ii)  The  exchange  rate  was  close  to  its  equilibrium  value  or  slightly
undervalued at  the  beginning of  the  1990s;  iii)  The nominal  devaluation induced a
10%-30% real undervaluation in 1994; iv) Undervaluation was partially or fully erased
between 1995 and 1997; v) Since 1998, deflation and rapid economic growth have led to
a new drift of undervaluation. While there is major consensus on the undervaluation of
the current yuan, the range of the different misalignment estimations is very large,
from 10% to 60%. The critical point is the diagnostic on the 1997-98 period: the current
undervaluation is expected to be large (narrow) if one considers that the exchange rate
was already undervalued (near equilibrium) in 1997-98. 
6 Which interpretation is the more convincing? Let us start with the main arguments of a
large undervaluation. The first argument is trade dynamism. The growth of Chinese
exports is impressive (for instance, merchandise exports increased by 33% in the first
half of 2005) and trade surpluses with the United States and the European Union are
huge (respectively US$162 billion and US$100 billion in 2004). These basic features are
systematically emphasised by foreign policy-makers.  However,  one can suggest that
trade balances would be more relevant than exports and then recognise that Chinese
imports also grew rapidly last year. Moreover, one can consider that the overall trade
balance would be more relevant than bilateral trade balances, and then observe that a
large part of the Chinese trade surplus with OECD countries is offset by trade deficits
with Asian countries. 
7 Regarding the current account, China has run surpluses for almost ten years (3% of GDP
in 2002 and 2003), which supports the undervaluation assertion. This situation is not
common for an emerging economy, even more so when it regularly exhibits signs of
overheating  (which increases  demand  for  imports). Furthermore,  Morris  Goldstein
considers that the “underlying” surplus is larger than the actual surplus considering
the overheating effect  and the lagged effect  of  the earlier  real  depreciation5.  Since
China runs capital account surpluses (which is common for an emerging economy), the
“equilibrium” current account should exhibit  a  deficit.  Consequently,  there exists  a
huge gap between the “underlying” and the “equilibrium” current account balance,
suggesting a large real undervaluation.
8 A large undervaluation would also be the main source of the dramatic accumulation of
foreign exchange reserves (from US$150 billion in 2001 to US$750 billion in mid-2005).
The central bank had indeed to buy huge amounts of dollars that would have induced
the exchange rate to appreciate under floatation.
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1. Real Effective Exchange Rate and Yuan Misalignement
9 What reasons are there to be sceptical about the existence of a large undervaluation?
The  weaker  argument  for  a  large  undervaluation  is  the  bilateral  surplus  with  the
United States since, as noted earlier, China runs large deficits with Asian countries. In
fact,  this  particular  structure  of  trade  balances  has  been  strongly  induced  by  a
structural change in the division of labour in East Asia, i.e., the relocation in China of a
part of the production of the emerging economies which grew rapidly in the 1970 and
1980s.  This  relocation  has  simultaneously  raised  imports  from Asian  countries  and
exports to OECD countries6. 
10 Another  structural  factor  of  China’s  competitiveness  is  the  almost  infinite  pool  of
labour (underemployed workers in the countryside and workers laid-off from state-
owned enterprises), which explains low (and flexible downwards) wages. 
11 A  good  illustrative  example  of  a  structural  advantage  that  China  has  over  other
emerging  economies  on  international  markets  is  in  textiles  and  garments,  as
dramatically revealed since the end of the MultiFibre Agreement (MFA) on January 1st
20057. This is illustrated in Table 2 reporting EU trade statistics for the first five months
of 2005, where it  is  clear that Chinese exports tend to replace the exports of other
emerging economies. 
 
2. European Union Textiles and Clothing imports
12 Third, the current undervaluation should only come from a recent appreciation of the
equilibrium real exchange rate because: i) the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) is
almost  stable  since  1998  as  reported  in  Figure  1;  and  ii)  1998  was  marked  by
depreciation tensions, suggesting the exchange rate was not undervalued in this year.
An appreciation of the equilibrium Real Exchange Rate (RER) should come from relative
productivity gains (economic growth and reforms) according to the Balassa-Samuelson
effect. However, the imports liberalisation induced by its accession to the World Trade
Organisation inversely calls for a depreciation of the equilibrium RER (since it would
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deteriorate China’s trade balance for any level of the exchange rate), even if the end of
MFA reduces the net effect of trade policy changes. It is reasonable to think that the
productivity gain effect would be greater than the net effect of trade policy, but would
not,  under  reasonable  assumption,  lead  to  a  rapid  and  huge  appreciation  of  the
equilibrium RER8.
13 Fourth, the equilibrium RER is supposed to ensure simultaneously external and internal
equilibrium  but  most  studies  have  underemphasised  this  second  condition.  High
underemployment,  as  experienced  by  China,  rather  suggests  a  RER  overvaluation
according to internal equilibrium condition. Consequently, studies that focus only on
the external condition simply overstate undervaluation9. The exchange rate is not the
instrument to be preferred against underemployment but a country that experiences
high underemployment cannot, arguably, afford a massive revaluation.
14 Last, a huge undervaluation is not compatible with the trends in the non-deliverable
forward market for Chinese yuan (in the Hong Kong or Singapore forex markets). First,
appreciation  expectations  were  not  dominant  until  November  200210. Second,  the
observed discount on the yuan forward rate has remained very low since then (1,5% for
the  one-year  forward  contract)  until  the  recent  revaluation.  Even  considering  the
distortion due to the peg, it is hard to believe that the “real” undervaluation is, say,
twenty or thirty times greater than the forward rate discount.
15 Considering these arguments―but keeping in mind the difficulty to have a clear-cut
opinion on exchange rate misalignment―the “moderate undervaluation” hypothesis
(10%-15%) seems finally more convincing. Moreover, being a developing country, China
may reasonably keep a competitive cushion to manage external shocks. Therefore, a
smaller revaluation than the 10%-15% range would be acceptable by China and foreign
trade partners. But what should be expected from such a revaluation?
The main argument: the reduction of trade imbalances
16 China  is  blamed  for  undervaluation  of  the  yuan,  which  is  assumed  to  exacerbate
international  trade  imbalances  (in  particular  the  US  trade  deficit).  Therefore,  the
reduction of trade imbalances is the main benefit to be expected from the revaluation.
However, such a result depends on the very nature of trade imbalances and on the
value of trade price-elasticities.
17 Let us start with China. As noted earlier, exports dynamism is certainly explained as
much by structural factors (wage flexibility) as by the exchange rate policy. Moreover
Chinese  exports  have  a  high  import  content  due  to  the  export-processing  sector11.
Therefore the China trade surplus is  unlikely to be very sensitive to exchange rate
fluctuations12. 
18 Do empirical studies find low price-elasticities? Unfortunately, export price-elasticity
estimations  based  on  recent  data  are  scarce  and  heterogeneous13.  Since  these
estimations cannot integrate the structural competitiveness of China, one could expect
that  the  true  elasticities  are  in  fact  smaller  than  estimated,  or  are  non-linear  (an
appreciation-induced drop in exports would be smaller than a depreciation-induced
increase in exports).
19 What could be the impact of revaluation of the yuan on OECD countries? China being
the source of around 6% of OECD total imports, and assuming a unitary price-elasticity
of OECD imports of Chinese products, a 10% revaluation of the yuan would lead to only
a 0.6% reduction of OECD imports. Moreover, the reduction of imports volume would be
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fully offset by the increase in price with actually no effect on trade balance. In fact, any
improvement in trade balance should then come from the expansion of OECD exports
to China. Exports to China represent 4% of total US exports, assuming a unitary price-
elasticity, US exports would be raised by 0.4% following a 10% revaluation, i.e. US$4.6
billion as opposed to a US current account deficit of US$618 billion in 2004. According
to Jonathan Anderson, even a large yuan revaluation would have a limited impact on
the US trade deficit, which is more affected by trade competition with the European
Union and Japan14. In the same vein, Ronald MacKinnon and Joseph Stiglitz point out
that the USA will run current account deficit as long as US private and public savings
are very low, whatever the Chinese exchange rate policy15. 
20 Recognising the small direct impact of the yuan revaluation, some authors emphasise
the  possibility  of  contagion16.  If  the  other  Asian  countries  (also  blamed  for
undervaluation)  follow  China's  decision  to  revalue,  the  overall  impact  of  the  yuan
revaluation on OECD trade balances would be greater. Morris Goldstein suggests that a
20% yuan revaluation could lead other Asian emerging economies and Japan to allow a
15% revaluation of their currencies17. Agnès Bénassy and Amina Lahrèche-Revil discuss
a case where most Asian countries follow a 10% yuan revaluation18. However, they note
that Asian countries would be certainly less prompt to follow an appreciating yuan (the
current scenario) than a depreciating yuan (recalling the fear of the “domino effect
scenario” during the Asian financial crisis).
21 At last, the expected impact of a 10% yuan revaluation on the intra-Asian trade would
be  even  weaker,  given  the  growing  importance  of  the  vertical  intra-industry
integration19.  One  cannot  ignore  however  the  impact  of  the  revaluation  on  third
markets (EU and USA) where China’s products would be less competitive.
22 In  conclusion,  the  Chinese  responsibility  in  international  trade  imbalances  and
consequently,  the  capacity  of  a  yuan  revaluation  to  significantly  reduce  trade
imbalances seems to be highly overstated.  By contrast,  China itself  is  obviously the
most  sensitive  to  a  large  revaluation,  which  gives  the  Chinese  authorities  room to
determine  exchange  policy  according  to  their  own  objectives,  rather  than  to  a
hypothetical  effect  on  trade  imbalances.  Thus  the  next  question  is  whether  the
revaluation has a positive impact on China. 
Other arguments: some conflicting effects
23 Some authors  suggest  that  revaluation  will  serve  China’s  self  interests20.  The  main
advantage in avoiding an undervaluation of the yuan would be to dampen hot money
inflows (probably about US$50 billion in 2003). Indeed, these inflows lead to a rapid
accumulation of  foreign exchange reserves that  has  some awkward macroeconomic
effects21.  On  one  hand,  the  amount  of  reserve  accumulation  that  is  not  sterilised
produces a surge of money supply (+20% in 2003), which may have two main adverse
effects: i) it may give rise of inflation pressure through an increase in bank loans and
investment; ii) it may make the banking reform harder by giving banks an excessive
liquidity,  which  reduce  the  incentives  to  improve  credit  allocation  inducing  a  new
surge of non-performing loans. On the other hand, the fraction of such an increase in
reserves that is sterilised (almost one half of the total in 2003) induces a significant cost
(interest payment on sterilising instruments such as government bond). 
24 An  indirect  benefit  from  revaluation  would  be  to  lessen  the  risk  of  a  revival  of
protectionism from countries running bilateral trade deficits with China (mainly the
United States, Europe and Japan). 
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25 However,  revaluation is  potentially  costly  for  China.  One of  Chinese  policy-makers’
concerns is the risk of deflationary pressures, though mitigated by a current rise in
inflation (almost 4% in 2004). However, one cannot exclude the possibility that a large
revaluation may put downward pressure on wages, causing a fall in domestic demand
(already weak) and output.
26 Financial stability is also of concern. Revaluation is automatically reducing the value of
dollars assets held by commercial banks and the Central Bank, with the latter being the
main loser given its net foreign assets of US$750 billion. Additional destabilising effects
on  the  financial  sector  may  be  expected  if  the  revaluation  is  carried  through  a
flexibilisation  of  the  exchange  rate,  but  this  point  is  related  to  the  exchange rate
regime, and not to the revaluation itself (see below).
27 Another undesirable effect might come from the strengthening of investment in the
non-tradable sector and particularly in the already speculative real estate. In addition,
the Chinese reluctance to revaluate may be linked to the political will to promote the
development of local firms, of which the productivity is probably lower than that of
foreign funded enterprises and joint-ventures. 
28 At last, financial markets response to revaluation (and thus future speculative inflows)
is to be clearly anticipated. The size of the revaluation needed to cancel appreciation
expectations may be too large to be economically affordable. 
29 To sum up, the above analysis suggests that China could bear a moderate revaluation
of, say, 10%, i.e. without incurring unacceptable costs on both external and internal
sides.
30 However, such a revaluation cannot be considered a unilateral effort on China’s part to
reduce international trade imbalances. Since China is not involved in an international
monetary  arrangement,  any  co-operative  action  has  to  be  negotiated  between
sovereign partners (as it has been done in the 1980s between the United States and
Japan) and not unilaterally required by one of them. In short, as the Chinese prime
minister Wen Jiabao recalled22, China’s government freely determines its own exchange
rate policy. Moreover, considering that the responsibility of international imbalances is
collective, why should China (a developing country with a per capita income of around
US$1,000) take a greater share of the adjustment costs than the high-income economies
(above US$25,000 per capita)? 
The debate on flexibility
31 Many agree that the yuan exchange rate system needs greater flexibility. Currently, the
main drawback of keeping the peg on the dollar is linked to short-term capital inflows.
In  a  context  of  appreciation  expectations,  and  though  the  capital account  is  not
officially liberalised, these inflows are sizeable. The Chinese monetary authorities thus
need to sterilise a large share of these inflows to keep monetary growth under control.
The sterilisation is carried out through the sale of government bonds (or central bank
bills),  and induces a significant cost,  corresponding to the gap between the average
return on international reserves and the interest rate paid on government bonds23. As
China is opening up to the world economy, financial integration is increasing (even if
existing  restrictions  on  capital  flows  slow  down  integration),  which  under  a  fixed
exchange rate, is not compatible with an independent monetary policy. Since China
needs  monetary  policy  for  stabilisation  purposes,  the  transition  toward  a  greater
flexibility seems unavoidable24. This view is predominant among scholars and economic
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newspapers  in  OECD  countries25.  Moreover,  if  China  would  liberalise  the  capital
account, the need for flexibility would be even greater.
32 Several authors however think that the dollar peg remains the best available option for
China and other East Asian countries, both for trade and financial concerns26.  Trade
intensity  is  a  basic  argument  for  pegging:  The  United  States  is  still  a  major  trade
partner of East Asian countries (even if share has slightly declined over the last two
decades), and of China (in 2004 the United States accounted for 15.2% of total Chinese
trade,  with  22.8%  for  exports,  7.7%  for  imports).  However  several  arguments  give
stronger support to the peg. First, the US dollar is not only used for trade with the
United  States,  but  is  also  the  prevailing  currency  for  invoicing  trade  in  East  Asia
(except for direct trade with Japan which is invoiced in yen). Furthermore, the benefits
of  the  dollar  peg  are  reinforced  by  the  lack  of  foreign  exchange  rate  hedging
instruments (the only way to hedge foreign exchange risk with yuan is to rely on the
offshore  non-deliverable  forward  markets  located  in  East  Asian financial  centres,
mainly Hong Kong and Singapore27.
33 As for trade, the US dollar is the main currency for invoicing capital flows in East Asia
since domestic  financial  markets  are underdeveloped.  In particular,  the majority of
East  Asian  economies  are  unable  to  borrow  internationally  in  domestic  currency.
Nevertheless, since they have run current account surpluses, most emerging East Asian
countries,  and  particularly  China,  are  currently  net  creditors,  thus  accumulating  a
large  stock  of  dollar  claims.  Ronald  McKinnon  named  this  particular  currency
mismatch  the  “conflicted  virtue”  syndrome.  This  mismatch  leads  to  appreciation
pressures on domestic currencies, inducing the risk of loss on dollar claims value, thus
pushing governments to the dollar peg. Since a hard peg commitment is too risky and
regional  co-ordination  is  far  to  be  efficient,  soft  dollar  peg  remains  an  attractive
option28. 
34 Moreover, greater exchange rate flexibility may produce serious disturbances in the
Chinese  financial  sector,  which  is  not  prepared  to  manage foreign  exchange  risk.
Admittedly, the restrictions on capital account transactions may mitigate these risks in
the  short  run,  and  give  time  to  improve  banking  competences  in  this  field.
Nevertheless, paying great attention to macroeconomic stability and recognising the
financial  sector  vulnerability,  the  Chinese  government  is  greatly  reluctant  to
significantly increase yuan flexibility.
35 To increase exchange rate flexibility, four main options can be listed, ranging from the
more to the less flexible: free floating, dollar peg within a widened band, basket peg,
and adjustable dollar peg. Considering the fragility of the financial sector, free floating
is not a feasible option in the short term (although suggested by US treasury secretary
John Snow in 2003). 
36 Morris Goldstein and Nicholas Lardy suggested a two-stage reform. In a first stage, a
widening of the band (from less than 1% to 5%-7%) would be carried out simultaneously
with a 15%-25% revaluation29. In the second stage, when the banking system would be
strong enough to allow a significant liberalisation, the foreign exchange regime would
move to floating. Widening the band is also advocated by Lu30, while Williamson thinks
that the basket peg would be the first stage of foreign exchange reform31. 
37 Among the three short-run “feasible” options, the Chinese authorities have chosen a
basket peg, so far without information about the composition of the basket. A logical
composition would include the three main international currencies but giving more
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weight to the US dollar. Williamson however derives an “optimal” five-currency basket
from the China trade structure32: US dollar (20,9%), euro (22,9%), yen (25,1%), and Hong
Kong  dollar  (19,3%)  and  Korean  won  (11,8%).  At  the  regional  level,  Williamson
advocates the adoption of a peg to a common basket by East Asian countries and using
the same methodology, the optimal basket would be US dollar 40%, euro 30% and yen
30%. Recently, the Chinese monetary authorities indicated that the basket mentioned
in the July 21st decision contains more than three currencies, i.e. not only the three
major currencies, but probably also the Korean won and the Singapore dollar and other
Asian currencies with smaller weights.
What has occurred since July 21st?Is the exchange rate really flexible?
38 To  date,  the  main  target  of  the  July  21st  decision―to  slow  down  hot  money
inflows―seems to have been reached. Did it  allow the Central Bank to significantly
improve actual flexibility? There is some purposeful ambiguity in the announcement of
the  new  foreign  exchange  regime  on  July  21st33.  Allowing  small  and  discretionary
exchange  rate  adjustments  does  not  imply  a  loss  of  control  over  exchange  rate
fluctuations. The modification of foreign exchange regime is actually likely to have a
slight  impact  if  adjustments  are  scarce.  A  crucial  point  is  the  use  of  the  band
mechanism, since the daily trading band of 0.3% a day theoretically allows a significant
appreciation, even in the short term. A few days after the revaluation, the Financial
Times calculated that a 15% appreciation could be attained in less than two months and
a half, and financial markets seemed to believe in the gradual appreciation scenario. In
Singapore, the one-year yuan non-deliverable forward rate then rose to 7.64 per dollar
(corresponding  to  a  6%  appreciation  over  the  next  12  months).  Some  financial
institutions (Merrill Lynch or BNP Paribas) forecasted a significant appreciation by the
year-end  (respectively  RMB7.5  and  RMB7.9  per  dollar)34.  However,  while  initially
having declared that the revaluation is only an initial step, a few days later the Central
Bank denied that there is any plan for further revaluation.
39 Actually  the  Chinese  exchange  rate  has  experienced  an  almost  unperceivable
revaluation trend since July 21st (from the revaluation rate of RMB8.11 per dollar, it
reached  RMB8.10  at  the  beginning  of  August  and  RMB8.08  at  the  beginning  of
September).  The  exchange  rate  stabilised  at  RMB8.07  at  the  end  of  October  until
December,  which  corresponds  to  a  0.5%  revaluation  since  July  21st.  In  short,  the
scenario of a gradual appreciation seems to move away, or at least to be postponed for
several months. On September 30th―a few days after the G7 meeting during which the
United  States  and  the  European  Union  urged  China  to  free  the  yuan  further―the
Central Bank announced a widening of the yuan’s trading band against the non-dollar
currencies. The yuan’s trading band against currencies such as the euro and the yen is
then  doubled  to  ±3  per  cent.  As  in  July,  most  foreign  policy-makers  commented
favourably this decision, although suggesting that the move was far from sufficient. 
40 At this point, the move to flexibility is too modest to produce any significant effect and,
on statistical grounds, the de facto exchange rate regime is still to be classified as a
dollar peg, though less hard than it used to be35. However, this “pseudo-flexibilisation”
has the same virtue as the “mini-revaluation”, it makes harder to criticise China for not
contributing to solving world trade imbalances.  This move is however probably not
only a diplomatic decision; it  also aims at signalling that the move towards a more
flexible exchange rate regime is officially initiated.
Is there a contagion effect among Asian currencies?
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41 Table  2  reports  the  very  short-run  response  to  the  yuan  revaluation  of  ten  Asian
exchange rates since July 21st. Exchange rate responses have varied, depending on the
exchange rate regime and, on circumstances36.  For instance, maintaining a currency
board arrangement, the Hong Kong SAR has not seen any significant move in the HK
Dollar exchange rate at 7.77 per US dollar (within the 7.75-7.85 trading band introduced
in May 2005). One can roughly classify the remaining countries as follows: The yen and
the baht have shown an almost complete absorption of the yuan revaluation even after
eight weeks; The won and the Singapore dollar (and to a lesser extent the ringgit) have
shown an almost complete absorption within two weeks but have tended to recover
progressively  their  past  level  since  then;  The  rupee,  the  rupiah,  the  peso  and  the
Taiwan dollar have been affected by the revaluation announcement but only soon after
when they demonstrated independent fluctuations. Three months later, only the Thai
baht remains tied to the yuan.
 
3.Incremental Appreciation of Asian Currencies as Compared to Appreciation in the Yuan
42 An  increased  exchange  rate  flexibility  or  volatility  in  the  region  would  have  been
expected following the July 21st decision. Surprisingly however, almost all exchange
rates demonstrated an unchanged or even a smaller volatility after July 21st, except the
Indian rupee, the Indonesian rupiah and the Taiwan dollar (see Table 4).
 
4. Exchange Rate Variance Before and After the Yuan Revaluation
43 Admittedly,  very  short-run  moves  in  some  exchange  rates  gave  strength  to  the
contagion  scenario  (particularly  Malaysia,  by  scrapping  its  peg  to  the  dollar  and
allowing the  ringgit  to  appreciate  right  after  China’s  decision37).  However,  one  can
guess  that  this  would  be  a  simplistic  interpretation.  In  fact,  currently  almost  all
countries  have  experienced  an  economic  and  financial  recovery  since  the  Asian
financial  crisis  and  the  turbulent  year  of  2001,  underpinning  the  move  to  greater
exchange  rate  flexibility.  The  yuan  revaluation  announcement  may  have  created  a
favourable  regional  context,  and,  for  instance,  Malaysian  authorities  used  this
opportunity to abandon the peg with less risk of market speculation. In conclusion,
even  if  an  instantaneous  impact  was  noticeable  across  all  Asian  countries,  the
contagion effect vanished rapidly, except for the Thai baht. 
Has there been an impact on the economy?
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44 One could consider that the time passed is too short to feel the effect of the revaluation.
However,  some  rough  information  could  be  extracted  from  short-term  situation
indicators and from economic forecasts before and after the revaluation. Right after
the revaluation, comments mainly support the view of a forthcoming negative impact
on  activity  and price38.  Two  months  on,  this  negative  impact  has  less  support.
Concerning the external accounts, export performance has not been affected by the
July 21st decision (see Tables 5 and 6).  Furthermore and surprisingly, medium-term
expectations about the current account show even more improvement compared to
2004 (US$53 billion or 4.2% of GDP), the International Monetary Fund being the most
optimistic. 
 
5. Actual Monthly Trade
 
6. Current Account Forecasts
45 Considering this impact on trade, it is not surprising that economic activity would not
be hurt by the recent revaluation (see Tables 7 and 9). There is no short-run effect on
industrial production in August (even more, industrial production growth in August,
+16.0%, would exceed the latest projection of +15.7%). Moreover, whatever the source,
the growth outlook has been revised upwards since the revaluation for the entire year
of 2005 (from 0.2 to 1.0 percentage point) and has been unchanged for 200639.
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9. Actual Monthly Inflation
46 Before  revaluation,  2005  inflation  forecasts  ranged  from  2.5%  to  3.6%,  showing  a
downward trend from the 2004 peak of 3.9%. An appreciation of the exchange rate
should have put further downward pressure on domestic prices. The overall picture
does not depart from this theoretical outcome (see Tables 8 and 10. The year-on-year
CPI increase in August was down by 0.5 percentage point from July. Post-revaluation
revised  forecasts  for  the  entire  year  are  effectively  weaker  now40.  During  the  last
quarter of 2005, all 2005 inflation forecasts are lying within the 2.0% to 3.0% range. 
 
8. Annual GDP Growth Forecasts
 
10. Annual Inflation Forecasts
47 While,  as  expected,  a  price  deceleration  has  been  slightly  reinforced,  a  surprising
outcome is that external account and growth expectations have improved since the
revaluation.  These  results,  arguably,  may  be  explained  by  the  small  size  of  the
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revaluation that was unable to lead to a dramatic break in the previous macroeconomic
trends. 
48 By revaluing its currency, China did not yield to international pressure. Admittedly, the
Chinese government took into account the political benefit of such an action, since this
will  mitigate  protectionist  pressure  for  a  few  months.  However,  its  decision  was
essentially  driven  by  the  wish  to  dampen  the  surge  of  hot  money,  attracted  by
revaluation expectations. One might have expected that the revaluation was too small
to fight these expectations. However, the Central Bank repeated denials that a further
revaluation may succeed in curbing short-term capital inflows41. 
49 To date, this is the main effect of the July 21st decision, since other expected effects are
limited. First, the lessening of exchange rate tensions is neither large nor old enough to
lead the Chinese government to speed up the move to de facto flexibility. Second, the
impact of yuan revaluation on Asian currencies has been modest and transitory. Last,
the yuan’s  revaluation has not  modified the previous macroeconomic trends of  the
Chinese  economy  (increasing  current  account  surpluses,  sustained  growth  and
deceleration of prices). In a broader perspective, the most important effect of the July
21st decision might be to signal the official start of the move to flexibility, even if this
move is slower than it was expected two months ago. 
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RÉSUMÉS
On July 21st 2005, China slightly revalued the yuan and officially modified the exchange rate
system.  Interpreting  this  move  as  only  the  outcome  of  international  pressures  to  reduce
international trade imbalances is however misleading. To support our argument, we explore the
rationale of the July 21st decision through a review of the twin debates of the exchange rate level
/ system in China. We argue that both external and internal concerns are taken into account by
the Chinese authorities in the management of the exchange rate. Moreover, responsibility for the
management of the Chinese exchange rate among the imbalance in world trade is in doubt. The
review of recent developments since the July 21st decision shows that its impact is limited. While
“hot money” inflows seem to have been tamed, previous economic trends have not yet been
modified1.
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